Abstract-We study the problem of information-theoretically secure secret key agreement under the well-known source model and channel model. In both of these models, multiple terminals wish to create a shared secret key that is secure from a passive eavesdropper. The terminals have access to a noiseless public communication channel and an additional resource that depends on the model. In the source model, the resource is an external source that repeatedly beams correlated randomness to the terminals; whereas in the channel model, the resource is a secure but noisy discrete memoryless broadcast channel. We derive new lower and upper bounds on the secret key capacity under both the source model and the channel model. The technique used for deriving our bound for the source model is to find certain properties of functions of joint probability distributions which, applied to the joint distribution of the source, will imply that they dominate the secret key capacity, and then prove the bound by a verification argument. A similar technique is used for the channel model. Finally, we also define a problem of communication for omniscience by a neutral observer and establish the equivalence between this new problem and the problem of secret key agreement. This generalizes an earlier result of Csiszár and Narayan.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. History and Development of the Models
I
NFORMATION-theoretic security is the most desirable form of security as it does not make any assumptions on the computational power of the adversary. Shannon was the first who precisely formulated the problem of secret key generation by multiple terminals, information-theoretically secure from an eavesdropper [20] . Since then, the work of Shannon has been much developed and modified; see for example [1] , [3] , and [10] . In an early work, Wyner [17] studied what may be called a "degraded broadcast scenario." In this setting, Alice is connected to Bob by a discrete memoryless channel. The eavesdropper, Eve, receives a noisy version of the output at Bob's end. In a subsequent work, Csiszár and Körner [3] generalized Wyner's model by assuming that Alice is connected to Bob and Eve through a broadcast channel. The channel from Alice to Eve in this model is not necessarily a degraded version of the channel between Alice and Bob. In this scenario, the secret key capacity, as one might expect, would be zero if the channel from Alice to Eve is stronger than the channel from Alice to Bob. The scenario considered by Csiszár and Körner was further generalized by Maurer [10] . Maurer made the interesting observation that even if the channel from Alice to Eve is stronger than the channel from Alice to Bob, Alice and Bob may still be able to generate a common secret key that is information-theoretically secure from Eve, in an asymptotic sense, if we allow Bob to send authenticated but public messages to Alice. In some sense, in this result, the communication between Alice and Bob is being used to agree about features of the noise realization in the broadcast channel that are independent of Eve's knowledge: this is the secret key. This observation led to the formulation of the two main models in this area, introduced by the works of Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] , Csiszár and Narayan [6] and Maurer [10] , called the source model and channel model. In both models there are terminals interested in secret key generation against an adversary Eve. In the source model, the terminals and Eve have access to independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of jointly distributed random variables and respectively. Following the reception of the i.i.d. repetitions of , in the traditional source model the terminals are allowed to have interactive authenticated public communication. The public channel is assumed to be noiseless. In the channel model, a secure discrete memoryless broadcast channel (DMBC) exists from the first terminal to all other terminals (including Eve). The input of the DMBC is governed by the first terminal while the other terminals (including Eve) observe the outputs of the broadcast channel at their end. In the traditional channel model, after each use of the channel by the first terminal, all the terminals are allowed to engage in arbitrarily many rounds of interactive authenticated communication over a public channel. Again, the public channel is assumed to be noiseless. We generalize both models somewhat by allowing the public communication only among the first of the terminals; terminals can listen and have to participate in secret key generation, but do not talk. This generalization has the technical advantage of putting one-way secret key generation and interactive secret key generation on the same footing and includes the standard model as a special one. Further, and more importantly, it provides an approach to study the secret key capacity by splitting it into parts in a sense that will become clear after understanding the main results of this paper. Following the communication, each terminal generates a random variable as its secret key, . All 's should with probability close to 1 be equal to each other and they should be approximately independent of Eve's whole information after the communication. In the source model, Eve's whole information after the communication consists of the i.i.d repetitions of and the public discussion, whereas in the channel model Eve's whole information after the communication is the outputs of the DMBC at Eve's terminal and the public discussion. The achieved secret key rate would then be roughly . The highest achievable secret key rate, asymptotic in , is called the secret key capacity. For a precise formulation see Section II.
B. Known Results
Calculation of the exact secret key capacity remains an unsolved problem, although some lower and upper bounds on this quantity are known. In the source model, for the case of , the best known upper bound is that of Renner and Wolf [7] . This bound, known as the double intrinsic information bound, is equal to , where is defined as and is called the intrinsic information [12] . The essentially best known lower bound, proved using random binning arguments, is due to Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] : the maximum of and . 1 In the channel model, for the case of , the best known upper bound explicitly mentioned in the literature, as far as we are aware, is , which was proposed by Maurer [10] . This can, however, be easily generalized to . The essentially best know lower bound, as far as we are aware, is (1) which one can find in [5] , [10] . Recently, Csiszár and Narayan have derived new sufficient conditions for tight upper bounds [6] .
C. New Contributions
In this paper we prove new lower and upper bounds for both the source model and the channel model. In each case, an example is provided to show that the new bound represents a strict improvement over the corresponding previously known bound. Furthermore, while the currently best upper bound under the source model, due to Renner and Wolf, is defined only in the case of two legitimate terminals, the new upper bound applies to the general case of arbitrarily many legitimate terminals. 1 Maurer provided a different technique for deriving lower bounds on the secret key capacity in [10] . He proved, for instance, that even when the maximum of the two one-way secret key capacities vanishes, the secret key capacity may still be positive. This technique, however, seems to give us a rather low secret key rate in this case. A generally applicable single letter form of a lower bound based on the ideas in [10] is not known.
Roughly speaking, our new lower bound in the source model is proved by following the interactive communication stage by stage; however, we have to do some careful bookkeeping of the buildup of the secret-key rate by controlling the amount of reduction of secret key rate built up in earlier stages due to the communication in later stages. The lower bound in the source model is exploited for deriving a new lower bound on the secret key capacity in the channel model. After the submission of this paper, the authors were informed about the existence of a related result in [18] in which a two-way key agreement protocol for binary random variables (in the context of the quantum key distribution) is discussed.
The technique used for deriving the upper bounds is to consider functions of joint distributions which satisfy specific properties that eventually lead to their dominating the secret key capacity. More specifically, in the source model, we consider a specific class of functions of joint distributions, called potential functions, and show that they satisfy the following property: for any secret key generating protocol, the potential function starts from the upper bound and decreases as we move along the protocol, and eventually becomes equal to the secret key rate of the protocol. See Section III for more details. The technique takes the following form in the case of the channel model. Take an arbitrary secret key generation scheme that uses the DMBC for say times. During the simulation of the protocol, the "secret key reservoir" (representing the amount of secret key bits built up so far) 2 of the legitimate terminals gradually increases until it reaches its final state where the legitimate terminals create the common secret key. The idea is to quantify this gradual evolution, bound the derivative of its increase at each stage from above by showing that one use of the DMBC can buy us at most a certain amount of secret bits, and that the use of the public channel does not increase the "secret key reservoir". See Section II of the second part of the paper for more details. Since its original application to the secrecy problem [8] , we have applied the same proof technique to capacity problems in multiterminal networks, e.g., see [15] , [16] . It was pointed to us by one of the reviewers that our technique is similar to that of "secret key monotones" of Lemma 2.10 of [9] .
Another contribution of this paper is its generalization of the result of Csiszár and Narayan [5] . In some special cases, Csiszár and Narayan [5] derived a single-letter characterization of the source model secret key capacity, notably when all the legitimate terminals know , that is for . This was done by bringing out a connection between a problem of communication for omniscience (CFO) by the terminals and the secret key generation problem. In the CFO problem, as defined in [5] , the requirement at the end of the communication is not a secret key, but that all the terminals become approximately omniscient about each other's random variables. The goal is to minimize the communication rate required to achieve this. In this paper we relax the requirement that all the legitimate terminals know and define a broader notion of communication for omniscience, called the problem of communication for omniscience by a neutral observer (still abbreviated as CFO). In the CFO problem, as defined in this paper, the terminals at the end of the communication wish to create a shared random variable which when provided to a neutral observer who has access to the i.i.d. copies of seen by Eve, allows the observer to reconstruct the i.i.d. copies of the variables (where is as before). The CFO rate is the minimum conditional entropy of the communication, conditioned on the information available to Eve, measured on a per observation basis. We prove that our CFO problem is equivalent to the problem of secret key generation (see Section II for the precise formulation of the definitions and Section IV for a precise formulation of the results). This result generalizes the one of [5] but does not appear to lead to a single letter characterization of the secret key capacity.
D. Outline of the Paper
We have divided the presentation of results into two parts, one for the source model and one for the channel model. The source model and channel model are two different (albeit related) problems, and this division cleanly separates the treatment of the two. Furthermore it leads to a reasonable number of pages for each part. This division, however, leads to duplications, and may blur the conceptual connection between the two models. In order to minimize the duplications, we have decided to include in part I a unified introduction setting out all the common notation and fundamentals. Part II of the paper will not be standalone, and is written under the assumption that the reader has access to Part I. Furthermore, the conceptual connection between the two models is emphasized in part II, where the results and their derivations for the channel model are compared with those of the source model.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we introduce the basic notation and the definitions for both the source model and channel model. Section III illustrates the technique used for proving the upper bounds at an intuitive level. Section IV contains the main results of this paper followed by Section V, which gives the proofs, with some of the details relegated to the appendices. Appendix A contains an example showing that our upper bound for secret key capacity is strictly better than the currently best know upper bound from [7] . Appendix E contains a counterexample to the natural conjecture (which we believed for a long time while working on this problem) that the CFO rate is a concave function of the underlying joint probably distribution.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
Throughout this paper we assume that there are legitimate terminals and one eavesdropper; random variables and will be possibly dependent random variables taking values from finite sets and . In the source model, we begin with a given joint distribution on and ; we assume that the th legitimate terminal observes i.i.d. copies of whereas the eavesdropper observes i.i.d. copies of . In the channel model, however, represents the input to a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (DMBC),
, and and represent the outputs at the legitimate terminals and at the eavesdropper. In both models, the eavesdropper is passive. • where is such that . This means that the indexing of the communications is done in round-robin order and each communication is adapted to the available information of the communicator.
• whenever where is defined as above. This means that the terminals are not allowed to participate in the communication. 3 Please note that if is valid, then one has . The communication is conducted by the terminals in an interactive way, over an authenticated but insecure channel (called the public channel); the eavesdropper is assumed to remain passive throughout, but hears the messages sent over the public channel. for all . This condition is saying that is created by the th terminal using the information available to the terminal following the communication on the public channel. 2) . This condition ensures that the legitimate terminals are, with probability close to 1, generating a shared key. 3) . This ensures that the generated key is almost hidden from the eavesdropper. We call such a strategy a secret key (SK) generation strategy, and denote it by SK . The corresponding secret key rate is defined as . The intuitive reason for this terminology is that we are measuring the amount of secret bits generated per i.i.d. observation of and .
Discussion:
We basically use the same multiterminal model as in [5] when all the terminals are interested in secret key generation. We have, however, relaxed the uniformity condition on the generated secret key, i.e., (2) in [5] . Maurer in [10] argued that the assumption of uniformity could always be added without loss of generality. A rigorous treatment of this point can be found in Lemma 5 of [14] . The idea is as follows: roughly speaking, a protocol that achieves a nonuniformly distributed key can be converted into one that does so at the cost of a negligible reduction in the key rate. The idea is to repeat the protocol several times and take the new key to be the concatenation of the keys generated by one of the terminals in each execution of the protocol, when the sequence of individual secret keys is typical. If the sequence is not typical, the key is set as an error symbol. This results in an almost uniformly distributed key. In order to enable the other legitimate terminals to reconstruct the key with probability close to 1 an error correction message is created by the distinguished terminal and revealed on the public channel.
Furthermore, in this paper we have adopted the notion of weak secrecy (where the equivocation rate of the key is made arbitrarily small), rather than the notion of strong secrecy (where the total equivocation of the key is made arbitrarily small). Maurer and Wolf showed that the weak and strong secret key rates are equal for the case of two legitimate terminals [14] . The idea is similar to the one mentioned above, i.e., to carry out the protocol several times, and send the error correction message on the public channel. Lastly, the leftover hash lemma is used to create a key about which the eavesdropper has almost no knowledge (according to the strong notion of secrecy). The strong notion of secrecy, and its equivalence with the weak notion of secrecy for certain models, was also studied in an earlier work by Csiszár in [13] using a different technique.
Definition 3:
Let be a positive real number. Take some valid communication and assume that following the communication, the terminals create finite random variables satisfying the following conditions : 1) for all . This condition is saying that is created by the th terminal using the information available to the terminal following the communication on the public channel.
2)
. This condition ensures that the random variables generated at the legitimate terminals form common randomness with probability close to 1. 3) . This condition ensures that the generated common randomness together with covers almost all of the information content of . We call such a strategy a communication for omniscience by a neutral observer (CFO) strategy, and denote it by CFO . The corresponding conditional CFO rate is defined as . Discussion: Intuitively speaking, a communication for omniscience (CFO) protocol works as follows: The terminals will conduct a public discussion in order to agree, with probability close to 1, on a common randomness, but there is no secrecy constraint. We can assume that there is a neutral terminal, say Charles, who receives from Eve and the common randomness obtained by the terminals. Charles is required to become omniscient about . The cost of the communication, called the conditional CFO rate, would be the entropy rate of the overall communication conditioned on . Consider the special case in which , and all the legitimate terminals know , that is for . Charles has access to . Suppose that he has learnt , meaning that is small. Since will be small too, meaning that the first terminal should have learned the random variables of all terminals. Furthermore since with high probability, the other terminals should have also learned the random variables of all the terminals. Therefore, the communication for omniscience by a neutral observer would be transformed to a simple communication for omniscience, as studied by Csiszár and Narayan [5] . The communication cost, i.e., the conditional CFO rate of communication, in this case is equal to the total entropy rate of the communication conditioned on . Since is known to all terminals at the beginning of the communication and, without loss of generality, the successive communications can be made independent of each other and of , one could have chosen them so that the communication cost as we measure it is identical to the cost as measured by Csiszár and Narayan. Therefore, the communication for omniscience by a neutral observer is a generalization of the communication for omniscience of [5] .
Definition 4:
Given positive , the -secret capacity when the terminals cannot randomize, , is defined as the limsup of the maximal SK rate as converges infinity. 4 Please note that the superscript " " is used to denote the silent terminals. Similarly, the -CFO capacity, is defined as the liminf of the minimal conditional CFO rate as converges infinity.
The SK capacity when the terminals cannot randomize, , and the CFO capacity, , are defined as
The SK capacity when the terminals can randomize, , is defined as the supremum of over all satisfying
B. Channel Model
In the channel model, the legitimate terminals have access to two resources: an authenticated but public communication channel, and a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (DMBC), described by the conditional law . Any message sent on the public channel will be heard by all terminals including the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is assumed to be passive and cannot tamper with the messages sent on the public channel. The input of the broadcast channel is controlled by the first legitimate terminal. The DMBC has outputs at the remaining legitimate terminals, and output at the eavesdropper.
Before providing a formal definition, we begin with an intuitive description of a secret key generation scheme in the channel model.
The secret key generation scheme begins by the first terminal inserting random variable at the input of . The other legitimate terminals and the eavesdropper receive and , respectively. The first terminal is assumed to have access to private randomness, implying that the random variable need not be a constant. We then assume that the legitimate terminals engage in rounds of interactive public discussion over the authenticated public channel; the number of communication rounds, , can be arbitrarily large. In order to enable the possibility of private randomization during the public discussion we assume that the first terminals are provided with random variables that are mutually independent of each other and of . 5 We use to represent this interactive public discussion. More specifically, is a message created by the first terminal as a function of , and revealed to all the other terminals (including the eavesdropper). Then the second terminal creates as a function of the information available to the second terminal at this stage, i.e., , and reveals it to all other terminals. The messages are created and revealed in a similar manner. Note that if will be created by the first terminal. This means that the indexing of the communications is done in round robin order. Furthermore, since we insist that only the first terminals can engage in public discussion, the messages created by terminals must be vacuous (for instance ; see footnote 2). The eavesdropper remains passive throughout, and only hears the public discussions and its observations from the DMBC. Following the interactive public discussion of the first stage, the first terminal inserts at the input of the DMBC. This input is adapted to the information available to the first terminal at that stage, i.e.,
. The other legitimate terminals and the eavesdropper receive and , respectively. Then the terminals engage in rounds of interactive communication over the public channel, where is an arbitrary natural number. We use to represent this interactive public discussion. For instance, is created as a function of the information available to the 5 Therefore, the total source of private randomness available to the first u terminals are M X (1); M ; M ; . . . and M . first terminal, i.e., . The message is created by the second terminal as a function of the information available to the terminal, i.e., ; the message is created by the third terminal as a function of , etc. This process is repeated for stages. At the end, the terminals create the secret keys . These keys should be equal to each other with probability close to 1 and almost independent of the total information available to the eavesdropper, i.e., the observations from the DMBC, , and the messages sent over the public channel.
For the special case of , the secret key generation scheme can be described as follows:
A formal definition of a secret key generation scheme is as follows: . This means that the secret key is created by th terminal at the end of the entire process. For instance, the information available to the th terminal is the whole public communications, i.e., , the observations made from the DMBC, i.e.,
, and the private source of randomness . 6) . This ensures that the secret keys generated at the legitimate terminals are equal to each other high probability close to 1. 7) . This ensures that the generated key is almost hidden from the eavesdropper. We represent such a secret key generation scheme by SK . The secret key rate of the scheme is defined as . In other words, we are measuring the amount of secret bits generated per use of the DMBC.
Definition 6:
Given , the -secret key capacity, is defined as the limsup of the maximal SK rate as converges infinity. represents the maximal secret key rate when the probability of mismatch among the secret keys , and the leakage rate are bounded from above by .
Definition 7:
, the channel model secret key capacity, is defined as Discussion: Note that we have allowed the first user to participate in the public discussion and to randomize (by randomize we mean the messages put on the public channel are not necessarily deterministic functions of the random variables received). Further, all the terminals who participate in the public discussion, i.e., terminals , are allowed to randomize. The assumption on the participation of the first terminal in the public discussion can be removed but this terminal must be allowed to randomize. Otherwise, the inputs to the broadcast channel will be always a deterministic function of the public communication and thus known to the eavesdropper, resulting in zero secret key rate. It is legitimate to differentiate between the ability to randomize and the ability to participate in the public discussion as long as the first user is concerned. For the sake of notational simplicity, however, we allow the first user to participate in the public discussion.
III. TECHNIQUE FOR PROVING UPPER BOUNDS
In this section, we illustrate the main proof technique we use for proving the upper bounds at an intuitive level. We discuss the technique adapted only to the source model in Part I of the paper. Consider the special case of . One can view as a function from the set of all joint distributions defined on arbitrary finite sets and to non-negative real numbers. Our technique for proving upper bounds on the secret key capacity is to identify certain properties of as a function, and then consider the class of all functions that have those properties and show that each of them is an upper bound on . . In order to show that the first property holds, take a particular secret key generation scheme for the triple . This scheme consists of taking say i.i.d. copies of , conducting a public discussion and then generating a secret key. One can, however, simulate the same scheme on the left hand side by taking i.i.d copies of , conducting the same public discussion, and then generating the same secret key. The difference in the number of i.i.d. copies observed is compensated for by the factor on the left hand side. Using the same simulation idea, one can show that properties 2 and 3 also hold. Property 4 holds since is known to be a lower bound on (see for example [1] where (2) holds because of property 1; (3) holds because of property 2 and the fact that ; (4) holds because of property 2 and the fact that ; (5) holds because of property 3 and the fact that ; (6) holds because of property 4. The above chain of inequalities imply that . Note that the triples can be thought of as representing the sequence of the information states of the system during the simulation of the secret key generation scheme. The function associates a value to the information state of the system in such a way that, as the scheme is conducted, the value associated to the information state decreases [as shown in (3) and (4)]. Thus, it is justified to view as a potential function. The above result could make the converse proofs systematic. Suppose we would like to prove that constitutes an upper bound on . It suffices to verify that satisfies the above four properties: the first property holds since ; the second property holds since if we for instance assume that , we will have ; the third property holds since whenever ; the fourth property holds since . In order to find a new upper bound, therefore, one might seek a function that satisfies the above conditions. Given any such function, the proof would consist of verification of these properties. In order to find a new upper bound, one can think of a given function as a point in the set of all functions that satisfy the four properties, and try to slightly perturb the expression so that all the four properties remain satisfied. Theorems 4 and 5 were derived using such a trial and error process.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE RESULTS
In this section, we state the main results of this paper. All the results are proved in detail in Section V and the appendices. Following the formal statement of each result, a brief informal discussion is provided to clarify the statement.
A. Sufficient Conditions for Being an Upper Bound on the SK Capacity
Theorem 1: Let be a real-valued function from the set of all probability distributions defined on , where and take values from arbitrary finite sets.
is an upper bound on if it satisfies all of the following properties (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . is an upper bound on if it satisfies properties (1-4).
1) For any natural number 2) For any random variable such that for some we have , it holds that 3) For any random variables such that for all , we have 4) . 5) For any set of random variables satisfying
we have
Further,
itself satisfies all of these properties and satisfies properties (1-4) . Discussion: The domain of in Theorem 1 is the set of all probability distributions on all products of finite sets. Condition 1 corresponds to the notion of taking blocks of observations. Condition 2 corresponds to the notion of terminal communicating over the authenticated public channel. Condition 3 corresponds to the notion of each terminal choosing to ignore part of its available information. The right hand side of condition 4 is a choice of an easily proved and technically convenient lower bound on the secret key capacity; other such expressions could also have been used instead. Condition 5 is relevant to the case where the speaking terminals are allowed to independently randomize.
B. Sufficient Conditions for Being a Lower Bound on the CFO Capacity
Theorem 2: Let be a real-valued function from the set of all probability distributions defined on , where and take values from arbitrary finite sets. is a lower bound on if it satisfies the following properties:
1) For any natural number 2) For any random variable such that for some we have , it holds that:
3) For any random variables such that for all , we have
4) is bounded from above by
Further, satisfies these properties.
Discussion: As in the case of of Theorem 1, here should be thought of as defined on the set of all probability distributions on all products of finite sets. Condition 1 corresponds to the notion of forming blocks. Condition 2 corresponds to the notion of terminal communicating over the authenticated public channel and paying the cost for this. Condition 3 corresponds to each terminal choosing to work with only part of its observation; intuitively the missing part can later be shared by incurring a conditional CFO rate of at most . The right hand side of condition 4 is a convenient choice of an easily proved upper bound on the CFO rate; other such choices could also have been used instead. It should, however, be noted that the choice in condition 4 is concave over probability distributions and this was important in the proof of some additional properties of the CFO rate given in [8] .
C. Connection Between the SK and the CFO Capacities
Theorem 3: For any joint distribution , we have Discussion: This establishes the equivalence between the problem of secret key generation and the problem of communication for omniscience by a neutral observer, generalizing the result of [5] .
D. New Upper Bound on the SK Capacity Theorem 4:
For an arbitrary natural number and finite random variables , arbitrarily jointly distributed with and is bounded above by Discussion: To understand this claim, start with the case . One can think of as trying to define a "split" in the secret key capacity: one looks for a secret key among the terminals that is secret from an entity that gets i.i.d. copies of (the first term on the right hand side of the upper bound) and then for a secret key that is shared by a terminal getting i.i.d. repetitions of (who is not allowed to talk) but is secret from the original eavesdropper (the second term on the right hand side of the upper bound). The claim is that the true secret key cannot exceed the sum of the two rates got in this "split" way.
The case of general can be intuitively understood as follows: suppose there are fictitious terminals, with the th terminal receiving i.i.d. copies of . The secret key generated by the original terminals is split into two components: one that is shared with each of the fictitious terminals , and one that is independent of some fictitious terminal . Assuming that is the secret key, we can write
One can argue that the term represents a secret key rate that could be created in a way that is shared with each of the silent fictitious terminals ; and the term represents a part that is independent of some . Although the upper bound can be interpreted in the above way, we originally derived it following the trial and error process discussed in Section III.
Theorem 4 leads to some corollaries that appear to deserve separate statements.
Corollary 1:
is bounded above by where the infimum is taken over finite random variables arbitrarily jointly distributed with and . A single letter characterization of is given in Theorem 6. A single letter characterization for the second term , the one-way secret key capacity from to in the presence of the eavesdropper , is also known (see [ 
1, Theorem 1,]).
Corollary 2: For
, we have A single letter characterization for the second term is known (see [1, Theorem 1, ] ). This bound is no worse than the Renner-Wolf double intrinsic information upper bound, and furthermore there exists a joint distribution on and for which the new bound is strictly tighter than the Renner-Wolf upper bound.
A variant of Corollary 1 can be proved by the verification technique that was used to prove Theorem 1. This is stated as the next result.
Theorem 5:
Let denote the set of non-negative real numbers. Given any function , define the -one-way secret key capacity as Then for any arbitrary strictly increasing convex function , and for any finite random variables arbitrarily jointly distributed with and , the secret key capacity is bounded above by This upper bound is in turn bounded above by Discussion: The -one-way secret key capacity can be viewed as a generalization of the one-way key capacity (also known as the forward key capacity) (see [1, Theorem 1, ] ) since the former reduces to the latter in the special case of . The upper bound given in Theorem 5 reduces to that of Corollary 1 in the special case of . We don't know if this bound strictly improves that of Corollary 1. The weaker form of the bound given in the statement of the theorem is useful because there is a single letter characterization for , given in Theorem 6.
The two upper bounds given in this theorem can be understood as perturbations of those given in Theorem 5 and its corollaries. This upper bound was obtained by the trial and error process described at the end of Section III.
E. SK Capacity for a Special Case
Theorem 6: Let and respectively denote the sets . The following formula on the secret key capacity holds: where we have Discussion: This result is a simple generalization of the PK capacity result in [5] by admitting silent legitimate terminals. This claim is best understood in conjunction with Theorem 3 as giving a natural Slepian-Wolf type characterization of the CFO rate in this special case. When it reduces to the known result proved in [5] . This lower bound strictly improves what is essentially the currently best known lower bound, namely the maximum of the two one-way secret key capacities.
F. New Lower Bound on the SK Capacity
Discussion: The first property that should satisfy is equivalent to the following condition:
Intuitively, assuming that all the 's and have learnt , the th terminal can create . The individual terms in the lower bound can be understood from the form of the one-way secret key capacity.
V. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix a probability distribution on where are finite sets. We begin by proving that is an upper bound on if it satisfies properties (1) (2) (3) (4) .
For every positive and , one can find some secret key generation scheme SK whose key rate is within of . We have (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) Inequalities (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) are true respectively because of the properties 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4. Inequality (15) holds because of the Fano inequality and the fact that the secret key rate of SK is within of . Therefore, we get
We get the desired result by letting and converge to zero.
Next, in order to show that would be an upper bound on if it satisfies all the five properties, we note that for any [satisfying (7)] (16) (17) Inequality (16) is true because of the property 5, and inequality (17) Inequalities (18), (19) , (20), (21), (22), (23) are true respectively because of the properties 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4. Inequality (24) is true due to the Fano inequality, and the fact that the conditional CFO rate of is within of . Therefore, we get The theorem is proved by taking the limit as and go to zero.
itself satisfies the four properties.
For property 1, note that the terminals observing can first observe i.i.d. copies of their random variables and then pretend that they are in the situation on the right hand side of 1. For property 2, they can take i.i.d repetitions of by the th terminal as the first nontrivial communication, and then pretend that they are in the situation corresponding to the first term on the right hand side of 2. The total cost would be the sum of and the remaining conditional CFO rate of the left hand side.
Regarding property 3, we first intuitively sketch the proof: one possible communication for omniscience for is to first conduct a communication for omniscience for . The terminal who wants to become omniscient, Charles, would be able to approximately learn with the conditional CFO rate of . If Charles exactly knew , the terminals could use a Slepian-Wolf type communication scheme to reveal bits on the public channel, thereby enabling Charles to receive these bits as a common randomness and become omniscient. The total conditional CFO rate is no more than . Even though Charles does not exactly know , this Slepian-Wolf algorithm still works.
We now prove the property more precisely. Fix and .
is defined as the liminf of the minimal conditional CFO rate as converges infinity. Therefore, we can find a large enough such that the following requirements are satisfied:
• There is a CFO strategy whose conditional CFO rate is within of .
• There is a communication with the total entropy of at most for the following Slepian-Wolf type problem:
terminals having i.i.d. repetitions of want to transmit their information to a receiver who has i.i.d. repetitions of as side information. In this Slepian-Wolf type problem, it is desired to have , Communication . The terminals first follow CFO and then the terminals insert the corresponding communications for the Slepian-Wolf problem on the public channel. Let denote the whole communication includes . We prove that the CFO is valid and further the conditional CFO rate is less than or equal to Using the inequality for any four random variables , we have
The other requirements for the CFO to be valid can be easily checked. The conditional CFO rate, i.e., is bounded above by For property 4, the idea is that, in the first phase, the first terminal transmits messages to the other terminals enabling them to find with probability close to 1. The entropy of the communication from the first terminal to the th terminal would be roughly , and this is an upper bound for the conditional entropy of the communication given
. Now, since all the terminals can include as a common randomness, Charles would be able to calculate . In the second stage, the first terminals reveal roughly bits on the public channel. Since this now becomes a common randomness, it can be passed to Charles, enabling him to learn . The total conditional CFO rate of this communication scheme would be bounded above by on a per observation basis, asymptotically as . Proof of Theorem 3: It can be easily shown that satisfies the four properties of Theorem 2 if and only if satisfies the four properties of Theorem 1. itself satisfies the four properties of Theorem 2. Hence
Further since itself satisfies the four properties of Theorem 1, we get Therefore Proof of Theorem 4: Theorem 1 allows one to systematically prove the correctness of the upper bound by treating it as an algebraic expression satisfying certain properties. More specifically, we simply need to prove that satisfies the five properties of Theorem 1, where the infimum is taken over finite random variables arbitrarily jointly distributed with and .
Property 1: It is enough to prove that for any , there exist such that
We take to be for . The inequality holds since the secret key function itself satisfies the first property of Theorem 1.
Property 2: Let , where . It is enough to prove that for any , there exist such that We take to be for . The inequality holds since the secret key function itself satisfies the second property of Theorem 1.
The proof for property 3 is similar to that for the two preceding properties. The proof is finished by noting that the secret key function itself satisfies the fifth property of Theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 1:
We get the desired result by applying Theorem 4 for the case of and noting that and
Proof of Corollary 2:
This is a straightforward special case of Corollary 1. In the case of two terminals we have The infimum is taken over all finite random variables arbitrarily jointly distributed with . We get the desired upper bound by noting that . could be further bounded above by . One can use the strengthened Carathéodory theorem of Fenchel and Eggleston to get the cardinality bound of on the size of the alphabet of . Therefore, the infimum over finite random variables is a minimum. It is enough to prove that strictly improves the Renner-Wolf double intrinsic information upper bound. In order to prove that the new bound is not worse than the double intrinsic information bound, it is sufficient to prove that for any random variable there is a random variable such that . Choosing , we will have and also
. Therefore, is no worse than the double intrinsic information bound. Appendix A contains an example for which is strictly better than the double intrinsic information bound. 
Proof of Theorem 5:
Take an arbitrary strictly increasing convex function
. Without loss of generality we can assume , because for any positive constant satisfies the following equations:
• .
• for any non-negative and . Since and is increasing, it suffices to prove the first bound in the statement of the theorem. In order to show this, it suffices to verify the five conditions of Theorem 1 for This is done in Appendix B. The proof uses the standard fact that the convexity of implies that it is continuous, and that is an increasing function in for any fixed .
Proof of Theorem 6:
This result is a simple generalization of the PK capacity result in [5] , admitting silent legitimate terminals. The proof uses the same techniques and has the same structure. We have, however, provided the proof in Appendix D for the sake of completeness.
Proof of Theorem 7:
It is enough to prove the lower bound for the special case of . This is because can be bounded below by since the terminals can collaboratively create i. is then communicated to the other terminals and thereby enabling the other terminals to create with probability . The probability that after stages all the terminals cannot agree on the common randomness will, therefore, be at most . In other words, if we let represent the th terminal's guess of , we will have:
We can bound from below by
The last inequality was derived using property 4 of Theorem 1. Since we can work out the last expression as follows:
where is the binary entropy function. We prove that is at least
If we can show this, the proof would be finished by letting tend to zero Starting with the second term where we have used the third above-mentioned property of the in the last step. The first term in the above expansion of can be bounded below using the fourth property of the Therefore Since, for every real number , we can conclude It remains to prove that, in the case of two terminals, the new lower bound strictly improves the maximum of the two one-way secret key capacities. Since , for simplicity we use the notation instead of and for the rest of the proof. We note that for any arbitrary random variables and satisfying the Markov chain , the choice of and would achieve . Therefore, the new lower bound is no worse than the maximum of the two one-way secret key capacities. We use the example and proof technique provided by Ahlswede and Csiszár in [1] to show that there is at least one example in which the new lower bound outperforms the maximum of the two one-way secret key capacities. Assume that and are independent binary random variables. The joint conditional distribution of given and is defined in Fig. 1 . Let . Assume further that has a uniform distribution. The upper bound is also a lower bound on . This is because the above expression is achievable with the choice of . But this cannot be achieved by either of the one-way secret key capacities. As pointed out in [1] , the one-way secret key capacity depends only on and . But is the same as . Further forms a Markov chain. Therefore, . The last inequality is because . Similarly, because is the same as as has a uniform distribution, and also because . The latter inequality is valid because .
VI. DISCUSSION
We have derived a new upper bound on the secret key capacity which generalizes and improves the double intrinsic information bound of [7] to the multiterminal case. We have also strengthened the results of [5] via a newly formulated problem of communication for omniscience by a neutral observer. Table I contains some properties of and suggesting a duality. The inequalities mentioned in each section could be derived from each other by the following transformation:
In a recent conference paper [8] we proved that where is the concave hull of (this is where the concavity of the choice of the right hand side of condition 4 of Theorem 2 was important). In Appendix E, we prove that is not always concave.
APPENDIX A
In this Appendix we prove the existence of a joint probability distribution on for which the new bound is strictly better than the double intrinsic information bound. In this Appendix, we use the notation to refer to the law of the random variable .
We need the following Lemmas which we will prove at the end of this Appendix.
Lemma A1.1: Assume that
, then there is a sequence of random variables taking values in finite sets , and a sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero, such that: We will perturb the example provided by Renner and Wolf in order to prove that their bound is better than the intrinsic information bound. Table II shows the joint probability distribution between and in that example. is defined as:
Renner and Wolf proved that for the choice of , one has and, therefore, their bound would be less than or equal to , while . Let be a binary random variable, satisfying the Markov property and defined as follows:
Clearly, there exist and such that the intersection of and is the set . If the constraint is not satisfied for some and , then it would be enough to perturb or by a tiny amount.
Let
. We would like to prove that the new bound is strictly better than the double intrinsic information bound for the triple . We have and Assuming that the new bound is not better than the double intrinsic information bound, we can apply Lemma A1.1 to get a sequence having the five properties given in Lemma A1. forming a Markov chain, since the infimum in the definition of the intrinsic information can be shown to be a minimum (see [19] ). We have
Hence
Taking the limit as , we conclude that as . Therefore, properties 2 and 3 are proved.
Since , so do for all such that . Therefore, for all should go to zero. Therefore, property 4 is proved.
In order to prove property 5, we note that Therefore, if and are positive, both and converge to zero. The Pinsker inequality, implies that both and converge to zero, and, therefore, the total variation distance should also go to zero.
Proof of Lemma A1.2:
Assume that for some (this is possible because the infimum in the definition of the intrinsic information can be shown to be a minimum [19] ).
. Therefore, . The denominator, , is a fixed constant depending on . Intuitively, since is small, with probability close to one it will be a constant. More is a small constant that will be specified during the proof.
We consider two cases: in the first case we assume . In other words, . Consider the scenario in which the first terminal wants to enable the terminals and to recover his message with probability at least . Slepian-Wolf tells us that there is a natural number such that for any there exists random variable of entropy that would work. Among the four properties that has to satisfy, all but the third one are trivial. Regarding the third inequality one can write:
According to the Fano inequality, is of order since can be recovered from with probability and the logarithm of the support set of these random variables is of order . The constant can be chosen so that . We get the desired bound on by noting that
For the second case, we assume that , or in other words Slepian-Wolf shows the existence of a natural number such that for any there are random variables of entropy , and of entropy such that is recoverable from , with probability , and from for any with probability . Now
On the other hand
The constant can be chosen so that . Therefore, . In the last inequality we have used the fact that the values of and are known. But since , we can conclude . This proves the third property that has to satisfy, i.e.,
. The fourth property can be proved by noting that APPENDIX D
In this Appendix, we prove Theorem 6. We first prove that for any , there are SK generation schemes whose secret key rate asymptotically approaches . In order to show this, it is enough to prove that for any , there is large enough such that the first terminals, after observing , can insert messages of entropy on the public channel such that all the terminals would be able to calculate with probability at least : will be a common randomness for the terminals, and Eve's whole information about this common randomness is bounded above by the summation of the entropy of and the entropy of the communication (i.e., . We use the technique used in Appendix A of [5] and apply Theorem 1.1.14 of [4] . We define a normal source network (NSN) without helper as follows: There are source and dummy nodes in the first layer of our NSN. The th and th node are both connected to . The second layer is comprised of encoders. The first encoders are connected to the first th nodes for . The rest of the encoders are connected to th nodes for . The output rates of the first encoders are . The third layer includes decoders. The th decoder is connected to the th and the first nodes of the second layer. It can be shown that the conditions imposed by Theorem 1.1.14 of [4] would be satisfied if is in . This result makes intuitive sense because for every set , the overall communication of those of the terminals that are in is at least equal to their uncertainty with respect to those outside .
For 
